Like other parties created from the “top” (i.e. upon the initiative of a few well-known personalities), ANO first orientated itself to attracting the highest possible number of voters by addressing them directly through the media and only afterwards started building its party structures.

Thanks to its strong financial backing, a relatively short time after its formation ANO could afford to finance a massive election campaign, which brought it seats in parliament. Thus, the party soon achieved an influential power position in the state, accompanied by a burden to implement unpopular reforms. At the time of the party’s origination, ANO leaders declared their resolution to change the state of affairs in which as many as 70% of citizens mistrusted political parties. However, after its entry into governing and parliamentary politics, the party began to manifest symptoms of those very same “diseases” originally criticised by its representatives. The party squandered its energy in fierce disputes with coalition partners, which were interpreted by the media as related to power, rather than a programme or ideology. In the first year following the parliamentary elections the party lost its position in parliament and its well-known personalities left. After Pavol Rusko’s entry to politics, links between him and the media he had owned in the past did not fade away. What is more, ANO is one of the parties with the highest volume of unsettled debts, which continue to rise. The party was dominantly financed by its chairman, which could not leave his position in the party unaffected. 

There are some indications that the centre of power in the party is concentrated in its top leadership and in the person of its chairman. The position of the leadership is also formally secured: in reality, its members cannot be removed from their positions during their term of office. The analysis pointed out some cases when the party leadership could affect the life of the lower party structures. Executive branches in the party headquarters have a dominant influence on decisions on nominations for public positions. The position of chairman is particularly based on a strong informal influence, which can be demonstrated by the following examples:

- the reservations of departing members about the authoritative party leadership, 

- the significant share of the chairman and companies interconnected with the party leadership in funding the party,

- the creation of the party solely upon the initiative of its chairman,

- some of the chairman’s decisions precede decisions by party bodies (for example, the chairman’s decision to participate in the completion of the nuclear power plant in Mochovce and its subsequent presentation in the media came before the party bodies decided on this issue).

As mentioned above, during the party’s brief period of existence some prominent party representatives (R. Nemcsics, B. Opaterný) voiced reservations about the chairman’s authoritative party leadership. Yet, these efforts in no way threatened the chairman’s position. On the contrary, the critics left the party and Pavol Rusko’s position grew even stronger. Other attempts at making the party “more democratic” have also been “suppressed.”

ANO seems to be one more element in Pavol Rusko’s “holding,” which can be demonstrated by bonds between ANO and Pavol Rusko’s companies (at present these are formally his previously owned companies). Members of parliament representing ANO rented their offices from a company close to the party leadership (Aurum Verde). The same company worked for ANO during its election campaign and the link between them is most easily seen when checking the telephone numbers of all subjects in this “holding,” which are from the same series.

The party has not yet built up a stable core of its electorate, which was last manifested in the first election to the European Parliament. Its preferences have been oscillating for a long time just below the level necessary for entry to parliament. The long-term stabilisation of the party may be threatened by the above mentioned factors: the too strong influence of a narrow group in the party’s operation, alarming economic results, the party’s weak background in society, and internal conflicts. 

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SDKU is among the political parties with the worst internal economic development and the highest number of discovered shortcomings in its economy (at the same time, it cannot be ruled out that such shortcomings are present in other political parties too). On the other hand, SDKU provides one of the most extensive statements of its economic data.

Among the parties under review, SDKU is the only one to introduce primary elections to determine nominations for public positions, which allows its regular members to participate in selecting their representatives (in the majority of political parties under review, it is the executive party bodies that decide on nominations). However, the top party leadership preserved the crucial influence on the final list of candidates for the parliamentary elections even in this model, not only by way of organising the primary election, but also by retaining the option to change the order of candidates afterwards.

The intra-party status quo for the presidium is secured by the fact that any change to the statutes may only be proposed by this party body, where the position of elected members is even more strengthened by their term of office (de facto four years) and the practical impossibility of removing them from their positions. However, the presidium can, under certain conditions, remove a member of the party leadership, as was the case with Ivan Šimko.

With regard to powers and creational relations, SDKU is the only party among those under review whose statutes give more prominence to the regional level at the expense of the district level (the district level of the party structure only consists of a board with purely coordinatory functions).

After three years of the party’s existence, its co-founder Ivan Šimko and other MPs left the party, which significantly weakened the governing coalition and contributed to the fact that that Mikuláš Dzurinda’s government became a minority government and cannot guarantee sufficient support from MPs for its bills.

So far, the party has been represented in two governments, which have had to launch significant social changes with more serious economic impacts on public living standards. Its representatives have been identified with unpopular reforms, which they have prepared. In spite of its reform and programme potential there is a concentration of several significant factors in the party that pose a threat to its continuity and sound development in the long run:

- alarming economic situation,

- unstable electorate,

- weakening human resources due to intra-party conflict,

- scandals adversely affecting the party’s credibility,

- closing the door on criticism (top party representatives frequently voiced accusations that their problems were publicised in the media as a result of a deliberate ploy by a group of unspecified persons whose aim was to discredit the party).

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SMK has long been reputed to be a political party that solves all of its intra-party conflicts internally. It is the only party that has not yet experienced the departure of some of its more prominent representatives or internal splits, even though it unifies different ideological streams. The above mentioned facts contribute to SMK being perceived as a stable political party by the Slovak majority. Yet, its stability is to a much greater extent caused by the fact that individual groups within SMK are aware that common action is necessary when enforcing the demands of their minority. The unity presented outwardly is a pragmatic decision by the groups whose influence would be significantly limited without SMK. This is because SMK, being a political party of a catch-all type, experiences the blending of various streams and interest (including economic interests) groups, which seek to take hold of influential positions in the party’s internal structures. These groups are relatively balanced in terms of their influence and individual “alliances” are formed on the basis of ad hoc interests, which contributes to maintaining the status quo and keeping conflicts from growing more radical. The party shows some oligarchic traits, which cannot, however be specified by naming some stable influence groups in it.   

SMK has also experienced internal conflicts, which even led to some prominent party members being expelled. Béla Bugár, chairman of the party, devoted part of his speech at the party congress in 2003 to talking about conflicts in the party and he literally said: “Unfortunately, it was only our hard-headed approach that prevented the party from falling apart in both cases.”

SMK is a relatively closed party, which is facing problems with the growth of its membership in spite of a relatively high number of its members. Many elementary party bodies became isolated and prevented new (young) people from participating in party activities. Therefore, many members of the Hungarian community stood as independent candidates in the elections and even managed to beat the SMK candidates. The party tried to settle this problem in an unusual way, which may have been at variance with the principle of intra-party democracy (see the section on non-standard powers of some party bodies).

In the 1990s the party was a frequent target of emotional attacks from nationalist political parties. It has been represented in the governing coalition for two electoral terms and it has not had to face such attacks for quite some time now. Recently, however, there have again been attempts by some political parties to make use of the crisis among nationalist parties and attract electors by evoking fear of the Hungarian minority’s representatives and their advancement. Even though prominent representatives of the party often fairly complained about the stirring up of tension and the misuse of the “Hungarian” issue by nationalist forces, the party itself sometimes contributed to increasing the tension. For example, when it was involved in a preparatory process prior to the implementation of the law dealing with Slovak residents of Hungarian origin (issuing ID cards for inhabitants of Hungarian nationality, who were to receive financial aid from the Hungarian government) and when it decided that the children of its candidates for the 2002 parliamentary elections were obliged to attend schools using Hungarian as the teaching language.

SMK has been confronted with several attempts to broaden its focus by addressing Slovak voters as well (such as the possible placement of Slovak politicians in its list of candidates for the 2002 elections), but they have never been successful. According to the survey data, SMK wishes to remain a political party representing the minority’s interests and not to allow greater participation by the Slovak majority into its intra-party life.

Due to the existence of the language barrier, the Slovak majority has little information about the discourse going on inside the party or about division of influence in the party. The influence of the party’s executive bodies is strengthened by the fact that it is these bodies that decide on nominations for public positions (except local self-governments). The survey has also disclosed, which was confirmed from several sources, that the final nominations for positions in the executive can also be influenced by persons close to the party from the business sector. The party’s members can participate in the management of the party through its national congress which is normally held once a year, the position of the top party leadership is secured by their four-year term of office.

SMK is among the parties most reliant on state budget funds. Although it has a balanced economy, the responsibility of its members in raising funds for the party is extremely low. Even the Communist Party of Slovakia, active in the poorest regions of the country, is able to collect almost twice as much money per member than the SMK.

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SMER originally labelled itself as a pragmatic party refusing to make things “ideological,” it later added the attribute “third way” to its name, and ranked alongside political parties in the modern, progressive central-leftist political stream. At present, it is possible to identify an increasing number of attitudes characteristic of social democracy in the statements made by the party’s representative body. This shift can be attributed to a great extent to the marginalisation of political parties with leftist programmes, whose electors can be attracted by getting closer to “more social” rhetoric.

The organisational structure of the party is designed to ensure the most efficient and operational management. SMER has a simple structure and its top leadership practically decides on all important questions regarding the party’s operation. Through regional board members (all members of this body are elected directly by the party chairmanship), it has a direct influence on decision-making at this level of the party’s organisational structure. Decision-making at the district level can also be directly influenced by the chairmanship body through district coordinators, which are directly elected by that party body and represent the party outwardly. In addition, they decide on many relevant questions on their own or propose that such decision-making should take place.

SMER is the only parliamentary political party whose statutes do not define the position of party bodies below district level.

Continuity in the field of the party’s human resources is secured by the four-year term of office for its top elected representatives and the method of selecting candidates for the party congress. Part of the delegates are selected by the chairmanship body, while the remainder is made up of the party’s founding members. What is more, both these groups have the right to veto. Thus, even a small group of founding members can prevent any “undesired” decision.

The party’s statutes thus systemically give most decision-making powers to a small group of its members. Opportunities for regular members to affect party decision-making are significantly limited even at the level of fundamental party documents. The position of the top party leadership, defined in this way, is incomparable with any other parliamentary party. The concentration of powers in the grasp of a narrow group of party members has priority over intra-party democracy, which is one of the signs of the instrumentality of the project initiated by Robert Fico’s decision.

At an early stage, SMER was one of the most open and helpful political parties. It placed great emphasis on communicating with the media and the public. Gradually, willingness by its representatives to provide information about intra-party life has diminished. At present, the party provides all information required by law, but it was the only political subject that refused to answer any questions in this survey.

The concentration of power among a narrow group of people, the excessive blending of the party and its leader, and limited opportunities for the party membership to influence decision-making in the party are regarded as factors indicating that the party lies somewhere between a “standard” intra-party democracy (as we know it from most political parties) and an oligarchic organisation headed by a charismatic leader. Furthermore, they limit room for constructive intra-party discourse and relegate the party’s members to passive recipients in decisions made by its leadership.

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The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)

The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) originated from a broadly-focused political movement called the Public Against Violence (VPN) and it has since retained that character. Up to this day it has the greatest reported party membership out of all political parties in Slovakia. In the process of establishing the new movement, the initiative of its leader Vladimír Mečiar, was of crucial importance. What served to create the strong bond between the HZDS and its electorate was the feeling of injustice after Prime Minister Mečiar was removed from office. Such a bond usually becomes depersonalised and transferred to a political party as an institution. This was not the case for the HZDS and the majority of its electorate is still linked with the personage of Vladimír Mečiar. His patriarchal relation towards HZDS is similar to certain management principles applied in leader-based parties. His position in the party was so strong that any crisis in it did not threaten the chairman, but led to its secession. Since 1993, several groups represented by important members of the movement left the HZDS (people around Kňažko, Moravčík, Gašparovič, Tkáč). In most cases, the reason behind the conflicts was the authoritative leadership of Vladimír Mečiar. Support for the HZDS is continually on the decline.

The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)

The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), is one of the few political parties in Slovakia that originated from the “bottom”, following the amalgamation of two small communist parties. Thus, the party took over the role of enforcing the communist programme. The original KSS party changed its name to SDL (Party of the Democratic Left) and transformed itself into a modern socialist party. KSS had insignificant voter support in the 1990s. It only became a parliamentary party after the 2002 elections, as a result of electors turning away from the SDL.